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Corporations - California Expands Majority Shareholders'
Fiduciary Duty to Minority Shareholders
Defendants, majority shareholders in a closely held savings and loan
association, formed a holding company and exchanged their interests in
the savings and loan association for holding company shares. The savings
and loan shares, unlike those of the holding company, were not readily
marketable because of their high book value. The minority shareholders of
the savings and loan association were excluded from participating in this
scheme, and the defendants thus retained control over the savings and
loan association. Later, holding company offers to purchase the minority
interests were substantially below savings and loan association book value.'
The minority shareholders claimed loss of significant profits due to exclu-
sion from holding company participation. The lower court found no prop-
erty right of the minority to have been damaged, and therefore no breach
of fiduciary duty.' Held, reversed: Majority shareholders have a duty to
allow minority shareholders equal proportional participation in any scheme
that utilizes or affects control of the corporation. Jones v. H.F. Abmanson
L Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
I. STANDARDS OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN CORPORATIONS
Courts have long been plagued with the problem of defining standards of
conduct among the principals in corporate activities. At the heart of the
problem are the competing policy considerations of assuring investors rea-
sonable protection from the self-interest of dominant, controlling corporate
interests, while avoiding entrepreneurial paralysis.' Resort has thus been
made to the fiduciary principles of agency and trust for a workable bal-
ance. Imposition of a fiduciary duty upon majority shareholders often is an
extension of the duty imposed upon corporate directors.! But the factors
giving rise to the duty and its subsequent application vary, depending upon
the relationship between the parties.
Duty of Directors. Generally, corporate directors are charged with the
'The holding company offered to purchase association shares for $1,100 per share when the
book value was $1,411.57 plus earnings of $301.15 per share. At the same time, those holding
company shares which derived from one savings and loan share had an equivalent value of $3,700,
and there had been a $927.50 return of capital subsequent to the holding company's initial stock
offering.2 Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 293 (Ct. App. 1968).
3 Note, Fiduciary Duty of Officers and Directors Not To Compete with the Corporation, 54
HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1941).
' The extension of the "good faith" obligation of controlling stockholders to the minority is
not a recent development. This duty was established in Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 F.
625, 631 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), where the court determined that "when a number of stockholders
combine to constitute themselves a majority in order to control the corporation as they see fit, they
become for all practical purposes the corporation itself, and assume the trust relationship occupied
by the corporation towards its stockholders."
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basic fiduciary duties of good faith in managing corporate affairs, not
profiting from insider-information, and not utilizing corporate opportuni-
ties for personal gain. However, the various states differ in their views as
to when and to whom these duties attach. The courts have developed three
basic approaches in delineating proper and improper conduct by directors.!
The old majority rule holds that the fiduciary duty is owed only to the
corporation.! Thus, injury to the corporation is necessary to establish a
breach of duty.' In recognition of the potential inequities of the majority
rule, many courts have created the "special facts" exception. This rule is
that where special circumstances exist which make withholding information
unfair, the duty to disclose arises.! The minority view, which is gaining
support,10 imposes a duty upon those in control of a corporation to act in
the best interests of the corporation and the individual shareholders. This
duty runs to all shareholders, and a director is precluded from receiving any
personal advantage by dealing with the corporation without the fullest
disclosure to all affected parties."
Duty of Majority Shareholders. Two approaches may be used to place
fiduciary duties upon majority shareholders. The direct approach looks at
the relationship between majority and minority shareholders, and concludes
that equity establishes a fiduciary relationship. The majority's position of
superiority and influence forces the minority to rely upon principles of
good faith and fair dealing. In the words of Justice Brandeis: "The ma-
jority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary
relation toward the minority."" The indirect approach looks first at the
relationship between the dominant stockholders and the directors, and
concludes that if the shareholder dominates the corporation through his
influence over the directors, then the shareholder assumes the directors'
fiduciary duty to the minority." Agency principles are used to extend the
legal fiduciary obligation of the directors to the controlling stockholders
who are responsible for the directors' acts.'
s Justice Cardozo defined this good faith duty as "something more than the morals of the mar-
ket place." He further elaborated that this was not honesty alone but "the punctilio of an honor
most sensitive." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
6 For a complete discussion of director duties see Note, Corporations-Common Law Liabilities
for Insider Trading, 23 Sw. L.J. 921 (1969).
'Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464, 196 P. 208 (1921); Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn.
210, 177 S.W. 479 (1915); 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 1168 (1965); Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L.
REV. 827 (1927); Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 YALE L.J. 731
(1918); Note, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 MICH. L.
REV. 267 (1910).
'The following, oft-quoted language is representative of this majority view: "[The] stock-
holders . . . had a perfect right to dispose of their stock . . . without the slightest regard to the
wishes and desires or knowledge of the minority shareholders . Ryder v. Bamberger, 172 Cal.
791, 806, 158 P. 753, 759 (1916).
'Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945).
1","Practically every legal writer in this field has approved the so-called minority view." Id. at
380, 159 P.2d at 984.
" Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 413, 241 P.2d 66, 74
(1952).
"'Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919).
"s This is the approach taken by the court in the Ervin case. See note 4 supra.
"4For a thorough examination of the direct and indirect approach theories, see Comment,
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NOTES
The United States Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert,a
recognized that the dominant shareholders should be charged with a fidu-
ciary duty. The Southern Pacific Company, through one of its subsidiaries
as majority shareholder, exercised control over the old Houston Company.
Pursuant to a reorganization, a new company was formed and all of the
new stock was issued to Southern Pacific. The lines of the old Houston
Company were merged with the transcontinental railroad system of
Southern Pacific. The minority stockholders received nothing for their
stock in the old Houston Company. The Supreme Court imposed a fidu-
ciary duty upon Southern Pacific as the controlling shareholder, and de-
clared a trust for the benefit of the injured minority shareholders. A fidu-
ciary obligation was placed upon controlling shareholders as if they were
"the corporation itself or its officers and directors."' "
In Pepper v. Litton' the Supreme Court said that a dominant stock-
holder could not use the corporation for his own personal advantage and to
the detriment of the other stockholders and creditors." Litton had formed
a one-man corporation and utilized the corporate form and fraudulent
salary claims to force the corporation into bankruptcy to avoid payment of
valid debts. Litton used his dominant influence over his corporation to
manipulate its affairs in such a manner that when one of its creditors came
to collect a valid debt, the assets had disappeared into another Litton
company. In a suit against Litton by a defrauded creditor, the Court im-
posed a fiduciary duty to exercise the power of control at all times for the
benefit of the corporation and not for the "aggrandizement, preference,
or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis."''
The Pepper case was extensively relied on by the California courts in
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.' This case involved two
brick companies whose common directors used their majority power to
strip the companies of their sales functions and transfer them to a corpora-
tion in which these same directors were the sole owners. The brick com-
panies' minority shareholders sued for the large profits made by the sales
corporation. The Court held that a director was a fiduciary and must ad-
minister the corporation for the common benefit of all shareholders."
Majority shareholder fiduciary duty was expanded in the celebrated case
of Perlman v. Feldmann." Feldmann was director and majority stock-
holder of Newport Steel Company during the steel shortage period sur-
rounding the Korean conflict. Feldmann sold his control block of shares at
a premium price to a group of the company's customers, thereby destroying
the competitive edge enjoyed by Newport. The court of appeals held that
The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the Minority Shareholders, 9 HAST. L.J.
306 (1958).
'5250 U.S. 483 (1919).
'1id. at 487-88.
17308 U.S. 295 (1939).
1Id. at 311.
19 Id.
20 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
21Id. at 413, 241 P.2d at 74.
'2219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the control premium was, in effect, a corporate asset, and Feldmann could
not appropriate it for his own benefit." Minority shareholders were entitled
to share in the premium paid for control.
California reached a similar decision recently in Brown v. Halbert.4 Hal-
bert, majority shareholder, board chairman, and chief executive officer of
a savings and loan association, sold his controlling interest at a premium
price of $1,548 per share. He then used his authority to assist the buyer in
obtaining the remaining minority interests for only $300 per share. The
state court of appeals said that a sale of a control block of shares is not
subject to attack per se, but when the price available to the minority is
highly disproportionate, the fiduciary seller bears the burden of proof of
good faith." The Brown case set forth the rule that the dominant majority
shareholder must act affirmatively and openly to obtain for the minority
substantially the same advantages as are due to the majority."
II. JONES v. H.F. AHMANSON & CO.
To take advantage of investor interest in savings and loan associations,
the defendants, majority shareholders, formed a personal holding com-
pany, rather than make the association's stock more attractive. The Califor-
nia supreme court found this action to be in violation of their fiduciary
duty to the minority to use their majority shareholder power to promote a
marketing scheme to benefit all shareholders proportionately.
The defendants relied on the majority rule that no duty was owed to
the minority absent fraud or use of insider-information. They pointed out
that control of the association had not changed hands, nor had the asso-
ciation been damaged. However, Justice Traynor, speaking for the court,
rejected this argument. Relying on Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-
Dandini Co. and Pepper v. Litton, the court found that the controlling
interest in a corporation, whether it be directors, officers, or shareholders,
owed a duty of "common decency and honesty"'7 to the individual share-
holders as well as to the corporation itself.
The court discussed the minority and special facts rules concerning
fiduciary duty of directors and officers. The minority rule was summarized
as one of "inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and
those interested therein."" The court cited with approval the long line of
cases in which the traditional rule was applied to enforce a fiduciary obli-
gation." The same duty was then flatly applied to controlling majority
Isid. at 176.
24271 Cal. App. 2d 307, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (App. Ct. 1969).
'lid. at 791.
26 Id. at 793-94. Conpare advantages available to minority and majority in the ]ones case as
detailed in note 1 supra.
27 Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 92,
599 (1969).
28id. at 110, 460 P.2d at 472, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
2"See generally In re Security Fin. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957); Hobart v. Hobart
Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945); Lawrence v. I.N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal. 2d
220, 100 P.2d 765 (1940); American Trust Co. v. California Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 98 P.2d
497 (1940).
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shareholders. Quoting Professor Lattin, the court agreed that "self-dealing
in whatever form it occurs should be handled with rough hands."' The
increasingly complex business world was cited as reason for the inadequacy
of these traditional standards of fiduciary obligation, and the court fash-
ioned a new standard "of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority
in any transaction where control of the corporation is material." 1
The court found that the defendants' business decision to form a holding
company rather than increase the marketability of the association shares
failed to meet this new standard. The majority chose a course of action
which prohibited the minority from receiving the benefits or increased
marketability of the shares. The burden of proving good faith in the trans-
action was upon the defendants." The court seems to indicate this burden
would have been met if defendants had offered all shareholders the oppor-
tunity to exchange their stock on the same basis."' Absent a showing of
good faith and compelling business purpose, Jones was entitled to exchange
her minority shares for holding company shares under the terms of the
original issue, as well as all distributions subsequently made to these
original shares.
III. CONCLUSION
Unlike Perlman and Brown, the Jones fact situation involved no sale of
control, no change in minority shareholders' proportional interest, no dam-
age to the association, and the fullest disclosure concerning all transactions.
The finding of a fiduciary duty in such a situation is against traditional
views. Jones in effect sanctions the views of Professors Berle and Andrews.
Berle considers control a corporate asset.3" Andrews proposes that any sale
of corporate control must always benefit all shareholders proportionately.
Under this view, sale of control would necessarily be allowed only on a
tender-offer basis whereby each shareholder sold a pro rata amount of
his stock. Such reasoning may force a majority shareholder to share every
selling opportunity with the minority. However, the fact that buyers
are willing to pay a premium for a control block of shares is an economic
reality, and mere receipt of a premium through an honest transaction
should not afford minority stockholders a claim of right. Hopefully, Jones
will not be extended so far.
Clark S. Willingham
'ON. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 12, S 8, at 565 (1959).
at Cal. 3d at 112, 460 P.2d at 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
a"Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
aaThe question of proof of good faith was not before the supreme court in this case, and was
to be decided by the lower court upon remand.
'A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 244 (1932);
Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958); Berle, The Price of Power:
Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORN. L.Q. 628 (1965).
" Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 505 (1965).
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